Voting machine lawsuit, oral arguments, venue change Articles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2011 Seals Governor invites voters to submit invalid ballots Oral Arguments 12/4 in NJ Voting-Machine Lawsuit My testimony before the House Subcommittee on IT Articles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2013 Oral arguments in NJ voting-machines lawsuit appeal Articles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2012 Broken Ballots Which voting machines can be hacked through the Internet? Security against Election Hacking – Part 2: Cyberoffense is not the best cyberdefense! Security against Election Hacking – Part 1: Software Independence Pilots of risk-limiting election audits in California and Virginia Articles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2016 Internet Voting, Utah GOP Primary Election Two cheers for limited democracy in New Jerseyįlorida is the Florida of ballot-design mistakesĮxpert opinions on in-person voting machines and vote-by-mail When the optical scanners jam up, what then? Ten ways to make voting machines cheat with plausible deniability Serious design flaw in ESS ExpressVote touchscreen: “permission to cheat”ĭesign flaw in Dominion ImageCast Evolution voting machineĬontinuous-roll VVPAT under glass: an idea whose time has passedĪn unverifiability principle for voting machines Securing the Vote - National Academies report How to do a Risk-Limiting Audit Articles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2018 Are voting-machine modems truly divorced from the Internet? ImageCast Evolution voting machine: Mitigations, misleadings, and misunderstandings New Jersey gets ballot-tracking only half rightĭid Sean Hannity misquote me? Articles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2019 Reexamination of an all-in-one voting machine Safely opening PDFs received by e-mail (or fax?!)Įlection Security and Transparency in 2020įederal judge denies injunction, so 7 states won’t be forced to accept internet ballot return NJ agrees No Internet voting in July, vague about November Ballot-level comparison audits: BMD Can Legislatures Safely Vote by Internet?Įmergency Motion to Stop Internet Voting in NJĭemocracy Live internet voting: unsurprisingly insecure, and surprisingly insecure.Why we can’t do random selection the other way round in PCOS RLAs.Ballot-level comparison audits: precinct-count.Ballot-level comparison audits: central-count.“Signal Loss” and advertising privacy on Facebookįive-part series on ballot-level comparison audits: It’s still practically impossible to secure your computer (or voting machine) against attackers with physical accessĪnother 2020 lawsuit over internet voting Internet Voting is Still Inherently Insecure Georgia’s election certification avoided an even worse nightmare that’s just waiting to happen next timeĮxpert analysis of Antrim County, Michigan Next Steps for Mercer County Following Voting-Machine Failure Articles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2021 ESS voting machine company sends threats Why the voting machines failed in Mercer County Is Internet Voting Secure? The Science and the Policy Battles Switzerland’s E-voting: The Threat Model Magical thinking about Ballot-Marking-Device contingency plans.What the Assessments Say About the Swiss E-voting System.How the Swiss Post E-voting system addresses client-side vulnerabilities.How NOT to Assess an E-voting System, by Vanessa Teague.Rivest, Charles Stewart III.Īrticles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2023 Unrecoverable Election Screwup in Williamson County TX Articles on Freedom-to-Tinker, 2022 ES&S Uses Undergraduate Project to Lobby New York Legislature on Risky Voting MachinesĪ PDF File Is Not Paper, So PDF Ballots Cannot Be Verifiedįive-part series on the Swiss e-voting system: Appel, Josh Benaloh, Karen Cook, Dana DeBeauvoir, Moon Duchin, Juan E. Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy,īy National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine: ( Non-paywall version, differs in formatting and pagination earlier versions appeared on SSRN.) Georgetown Law Technology Review, volume 4, pages 523-541, 2020.īallot-Marking Devices Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters, by Andrew W. University of New Hampshire Law Review, to appear 2023.Įvidence-Based Elections: Create a Meaningful Paper Trail, then Audit, by Andrew W. ![]() ![]() Is Internet Voting Trustworthy? The Science and the Policy Battles, by Andrew W. Andrew Appel's studies of voting technology Andrew W.
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